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I. Introduction
A review of contemporary civil-military cooperation efforts in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo identifies distinct patterns and lessons learned that emerge despite a wide range of mission complexities. It is critical that the United States and its allies make better use of these lessons learned and insist upon robust pre-deployment coordination between civil-military authorities in order to help define organizational and transitional requirements for a wide-range of conflict termination scenarios.
Recent U.S. contingency operations demonstrate a continuing pattern of inadequate predeployment coordination between the U.S. military, other governmental agencies, coalition partners, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Moreover, the planning component for civilmilitary liaison is often treated with disdain or indifference. Dynamic environmental factors related to a broad range of political, economic, and geographic issues exacerbate the complexities of this coordination-but are often overlooked or disregarded during mission analysis.
Although the accelerated nature of crisis planning suggests limited opportunities to develop relationships or conduct adequate civilian infrastructure surveys, it remains critical that civil-military liaisons be established to the maximum extent possible and coordination issues be resolved as early as practicable before military deployment. In addition, failure to adequately define parameters such as infrastructure requirements, coalition mandates, and the presence of unique cultural issues has resulted in military "mission creep" and delayed long-term mission success.
II. Background
Civil-military Operations (CMO) are bound by legal parameters dictated by the Constitution, Presidential Directives, statutory law, departmental regulations, international law, treaties and country agreements. Consequently, civil-military strategy and operations must be a part of the overall national strategy and plans. Interagency coordination is necessary for leading and transcending guidance for theater and regional plan development and operations. 
III. Case Study-HAITI
Planning for civil and humanitarian affairs in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and the eventual turnover to a United Nations mission was imbedded in U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) Joint Task Force (JTF) 180, and foreign policy agencies throughout the U.S. Government. Despite those efforts, most civil-military liaison and mission assessment was conducted after personnel had deployed. Moreover, although considerable efforts were initiated to prepare for a military deployment in support of a forced security environment conducive to President Jean-Paul Aristide's government's return, actual planning for detailed civil-military coordination received only cursory attention.
Although successful civil-military operations and a relatively smooth transition from U.S.
military to UN multinational forces and eventually to local authorities were achieved, the general lack of concert between participating governmental agencies and significant delays in establishing effective civil-military coordination suggests that overall mission planning was ineffective.
"Generally speaking, there was unity of purpose throughout the ad hoc planning process, but unity of effort was by no means perfect." Council Executive Committee in May 1994. 5 Despite that initiative, interagency planning was slow and disjointed due to the classified compartmentalization of USACOM's planning that was necessitated by the secrecy regarding the July-August 1994 decision to use force.
Until that time, planning could not appear to be publicly "front-running" the President's stated policy. That prevented extensive DOD-interagency coordination until the last few weeks prior to the operation. 6 "In sum, interagency dialogue was adequate at the strategic planning level…but interagency discussions were not carried through to the operational level and linkages between the strategic and operational levels were deficient." 7 The nature of contingency planning suggests that such an accelerated time limit is typical; i.e., the time between when the President publicly states, in effect, that force is likely to be used often occurs late in the operational planning cycle, thus leaving little practical opportunity to perform extensive coordination with other agencies.
Despite the institution of a CMOC, there were many examples of disjointed communications between military and civilian organizations, resulting in several false assumptions and missed coordination opportunities by various participating agencies. Most CMOC actions were day-to-day and did not integrate long-term programs. 8 Though the operation was ultimately successful, most of the interagency planning had to be done after-the-fact once people were on the ground.
Transition to Local Authority
Overall, the UN Security Council resolutions provided a structure for operational planners to make the transition from a U.S. action (JTF 190) to a follow-on force. Once the threat of initial combat and the disarmament of Haitian secret police occurred, the troops from other nations started integrating with the largely U.S. initial force deployment. By the time the United
States turned over leadership to the UN Mission in Haiti in March 1995, chains of authority were streamlined and the organization was well prepared for transition to new leaders. 9 The UN and United States were essentially working the situation in Haiti in complete lock step, including all aspects of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME). affairs. 20 The primary intent was to make the MNF mission irrelevant by fostering a rapid return to host-nation self-sufficiency.
In support of that philosophy, CIMIC personnel focused on surveys, inspections, coordination services, etc., avoiding the development of a local sense of dependency, which essentially maximized host-nation participation in problem resolution. 21 An additional key task for CIMICs was to facilitate the rapid return of traditional services such as power, roads, telecommunications, water, and legal affairs. The fundamental objective was self-sustainment development to such a level that military departure would not dramatically affect quality of life.
V. Case Study-KOSOVO
In support of Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, regional commanders relied on extensive support from local and international aid agencies, the United Nations, NATO, and several national agencies. That task required an extensive effort to coordinate and synchronize the transition effort, relying heavily on lessons learned during recent operations in Bosnia.
Lacking a comprehensive campaign plan from NATO J-9, Task Force (TF) Falcon G-5
and Tactical Civil Affairs Teams had to develop and coordinate civil-military operations for the Multinational Brigade East (MNB-E). 22 The major focus of that interagency work at the operational and tactical levels was conducted by CMOC-CIMIC. Teams and staff in TF Falcon relied on existing experience and relationships to facilitate the return of Kosovo to appropriate civilian and international control. With the United Kingdom as the initial lead for NATO, the CIMIC integration piece was simplified. NATO J-9, however, lacked a comprehensive CMO plan, which made for a disjointed and patchwork CMO campaign throughout Kosovo. In lieu of a campaign plan, task force staff and civil affairs operators developed a local campaign for the MNB(E) to address the immediate problems in the regions under TF Falcon operational control. 23 While the CMOC-CIMIC reported directly to the G-5 on the TF Falcon staff, it had a reporting responsibility to the NATO CIMIC in Pristina. Daily reports capturing the extent and focus of operation were sent to the NATO J-9. Lacking a comprehensive campaign regimen, it fell on the CMOC-CIMIC to develop a plan for each region. In MNB-E, each CIMIC was colocated with the major lead NGOs and UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) staff. That gave the CMOC-CIMIC invaluable access to cross-coordinate message and mission. 24 Close integration of the CA forces with UN, NGO, and local authorities was key to the success of CIMIC activities in Kosovo. Another method to ensure lateral dissemination of information derived from the population was the use of Regional Information Centers (RICs).
RICs acted as routing and distribution points to free up forces by focusing information on emerging trends to the appropriate agency. Each major population center had a CMOC-CIMIC-RIC established to act as the interface between those different groups.
Transition to Local Authority
Detailed understanding of local needs, international politics, and organizational agendas allowed for better cooperation by the various agencies responsible for the implementation of the Kosovo peace plan. One of the keys to the success in Kosovo was the ability of TF Falcon to restore a degree of normalcy to the region. That was mainly accomplished by the establishment of CMOC-CIMIC centers to synchronize and coordinate interagency activities. That interagency work was key to reestablishing the critical infrastructure needed for stability.
Close cooperation with UNMIK facilitated the establishment of a competent civil administration of Kosovar Albanians. It was accomplished by close coordination between CMOC personnel, UNMIK senior leadership, and OSCE members. The CMOC personnel, because of intimate ties with the local population, were able to identify and locate competent personnel to oversee critical activities in Kosovo. As a direct result of those ties, MNB-E was the first region to have a civil administration vetted and approved by UNMIK in Kosovo.
Restoration of infrastructure and civil capabilities was greatly enhanced by the interaction between various NGOs and CIMIC-CMOC personnel. By conducting detailed assessments of the electrical, water, medical, and other vital services, CMOC personnel were able to focus relief efforts by providing timely and critical data to NGOs as they came back into Kosovo.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the wide variety of mission objectives and varied cultural, political, and security environments in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, significant themes emerge that underscore the necessity of robust pre-deployment civil-military planning. In each case, pre-deployment civilmilitary coordination was grossly inadequate and CMOC-CIMIC planners routinely underestimated the scope of mission requirements. In Haiti and Bosnia, vital relationships between military personnel, NGOs, interagency personnel, and coalition partners were developed only after key civil affairs personnel arrived in country. That delay hampered the achievement of synchronous civil-military effort and inhibited rapid understanding of organizational relationships, particularly with regard to multinational forces whose civil affairs doctrine was often at variance with U.S. initiatives.
On a more positive note, each successive operation enjoyed considerable improvement over its predecessor, suggesting that lessons learned gave decision-makers a better appreciation of requirements for effective civil-military planning. That was most apparent in Kosovo, which benefited from significant improvements in interagency cooperation. In addition, key relationships with UN-NGO-coalition partners were established prior to civil affairs personnel setting Such a tactic serves several key purposes:
-Legitimizes the local government to the populace -Gives the host-nation government confidence and procedural guidance for establishing a new government -Slowly guides the host nation at every transition level, and allows the host nation to migrate towards total control -Establishes a framework for defining milestones, success and exit criteria at every level and provides an avenue for central planning, coordination and data collection Fourth, the rapid identification of and support for the redevelopment of primary services, including power and coal, natural gas, roads and bridges, telecommunications, water, police and legal rights, was critical to the reconstruction of civilian infrastructure and establishment of selfsufficiency. That identification and attention was critical to the achievement of an acceptable end state conducive to the redeployment of U.S. and coalition forces. Often, the most challenging component of the requirement was determining what defined the return to "normalcy." Civil affairs integration at the lowest levels of the civilian populace proved critical in defining those conditions.
Finally, the importance of developing solid personal relationships between military personnel, NGOs, interagency personnel, coalition partners, and host-nation personnel cannot be overstated. As discussed, it was particularly apparent in Bosnia and Kosovo. Understanding the local needs, international implications, and organizational agendas of the local organizations was crucial to mission success-but understanding those complex issues took time and U.S. personnel repeatedly squandered valuable opportunities to develop key relationships due to deployment delays or inadequate mission analysis. The bottom line for successful execution was the ability of U.S. forces to understand and communicate with all participants in contingency operations.
Civil-military coordination centers (CMOCs-CIMICs) and comprehensive training proved vital to that execution.
VII. SUMMARY
Analysis from the Haiti, Kosovo, and Bosnia case studies confirms that the United States, UN, and coalition partners must place considerably more emphasis on the civil affairs component of pre-mission planning. Additional areas that require greater emphasis include coordination and procedural elements and the identification of a coherent civil-military command and coordination with NGO/PVO organizations to optimize their resource use and support role. In addition, it is paramount that the United States carefully analyze and implement the best approaches to help legitimize host-government infrastructure after a conflict. That fosters a national self-sustaining road map instead of a dependency condition upon a host nation and supporting agencies. Taking the time up front for all of these actions will considerably alleviate problems and help the CMOC execute and adapt to unforeseen transitional challenges in any theater engagement.
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